INTERNAL EVALUATION REPORT
CIVIL AND VOTER REGISTRATION PILOT PROJECT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND THE INDEPENDENT ELECTIONS
COMMISSION OF AFGHANISTAN

UNDER UNDP "ENHANCING LEGAL AND ELECTORAL CAPACITY FOR TOMORROW" PROJECT (ELECT)

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FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE INDEPENDENT ELECTIONS COMMISSION OF AFGHANISTAN, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM & THE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEM (IFES-Democracy at Large)

By

Hadija Miiro
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan
Project

Denise Dauphinais
Chief Electoral

UNDP-ELECT

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
Project

Hadija Miiro
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan
Project

Denise Dauphinais
Chief Electoral

UNDP-ELECT

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

a. __Introduction__

The internal evaluation of the Civil and Voter (CVR) Registration Project is in line with the project management requirement to assess the implementation of pilot activities. This assessment is to be forward-looking in that it is to yield recommendations regarding the feasibility and affordability of implementing a national wide CVR project using the tested data collection methodologies or some combination of methodologies. Under the Afghan Compact of January/February, 2006 which set benchmarks for Afghanistan's development goals after the transition period.

"A permanent civil and voters' registry with a single national identity document will be established by end-2009"

To enable the emerging voters' list and ID card from the project be used in the Presidential Elections of March/April 2009, a more programmatic date of end-2008 for completion of the exercise was set in the UNDP/ELECT Project plan of September 2006-to September 2008[1].

The core goals of the CVR Pilot Project were:
1. To test the concept of joint civil and voter registration in order to determine the feasibility of data collection and anti- fraud technologies and lay the ground work for a national civil and voter registration exercise.
   The national registration of all Afghan citizens, men and women of all ages would yield an efficient, accurate and sustainable database that would enable the issuance of a single uniform national identification card and create a voters' list that attaches each individual of voting age to a particular polling station.
2. To enhance the capacity of the cooperating agencies, most importantly the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI), to collaboratively manage a nation-wide registration process which would lay the foundation for a free, fair and sustainable electoral process based on an electoral register that is current, complete and up to international standards.

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[1] Afghanistan, United Nations Development Program, *Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT)* 2006)

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
Project

b. **Key Findings**

1. A National Joint CVR Project is not feasible in the 15 months before the March/April 2009 Presidential Elections unless massive resources and a well coordinated management structure are pulled together by the end of 2007.
2. Ministry of Interior did not demonstrate the ability, capacity and willingness to take up a leading role in implementing the National Joint CVR Project
3. With in the time limits, a computerized data entry module was established to be more efficient and more suitable than the manual system in capturing applicants' information provided enough people with basic computer skills can be identified, recruited and trained with in the required time frame.
4. Using both iris and facial recognition as means to identify duplicate registrations is not necessary for purposes of voter registration. This review takes no position on its utility for the purposes of civil registration and the issuance of a national ID card.
5. The use of iris scan technology increases the cost of registration tremendously as iris scan cameras and matching software were found to be three times more costly than facial recognition equipment and software.
6. In any case even when iris recognition is preferred, facial cameras and associated software will have to be purchased as a photograph is required for the national ID and or voter card
7. The lack of a voter registration department, which would have been the natural organization "home" of the CVR Pilot Project at IEC and staff dedicated to the voter registration function, hampered the successful implementation of the project. Related to this was the absence of a dedicated project coordinator and a similar national counterpart at the IEC.
8. Poor coordination between the two major implementing partners: IEC and MoI slowed the process
9. Different organizational mandates and bureaucratic imperatives may be one reason for the relative lack of engagement of the MoI. While the MoI has virtually no time limit in which to design and conduct civil registration, the IEC is required by law to prepare a voters' registry in time for each constitutionally mandated election. While this is a perfectly normal occurrence, greater efforts to address inter-organizational differences in future collaborative efforts will be required.
10. Proper planning, adequate resources, good coordination and an early start can rectify many of the problems encountered during the CVR Pilot. These lessons will form a critical input in the implementation of the national registration project

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT Project

c. <u>**Key Recommendations**</u>

1. In the short run, the civil registry should be de linked from the voters' registry and the IEC be let to conduct voter registration of only persons aged 16 years or above. Although the eligible voting age is 18 year or above, registration of persons between 16 and 18 years would enable the inclusion of all persons who would have attained 18 years at the time of the 2009 elections without necessarily going back to the field.
2. The computerized data entry module should be used for data capture because it proved to require less time, was less prone to errors and enabled a more efficient way of data recovery and retrieval in cases of data losses and corruption. Consideration must however be made to the need to timely identify and recruit personnel with basic computer skills and to train them adequately well in time for the exercise.
3. Facial recognition should be used for duplicate analysis, as the same photograph for the voter/Id card is sufficient for duplicate analysis. Facial recognition also provided a visual review of the duplicate images in cases of mismatches. In addition, facial recognition proved to be less expensive and is more widely used in large electoral and civil registration databases
4. The elections commission should set up a voter registration department with dedicated staff and should strengthen its translation unit as priority areas.
5. To cut costs and avoid duplication of resources, all data required for voting and the civil registry be captured from all registered applicants. A complete database of all applicants aged 16 years or above is expected to be passed on to the ministry of interior as a starting point for the civil registry.

II. BACKGROUND

a. <u>**Voter Registration in Afghanistan**</u>

A national voter registration exercise was conducted by the United Nations in 2003/04 in preparation for the presidential elections of October 2004. The methodology for data collection was to send teams to communities across the country to collect information on paper forms with pre-printed unique serial numbers. A Polaroid photo was taken and each registrant received a simple voter's card with their photo at the time of registration. No photographs were retained by the registration teams and completed forms were returned to Kabul for data capture thru manual data entry. An update was also conducted in advance of the 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Council elections utilizing this same methodology.

Khadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
Project

This process did not yield a register up to internationally acceptable standards. Indeed, many of the issues surrounding the large number of ballots and materials procured for the 2005 elections arose because it was impossible for election administrators to allocate individual voters to an exact polling location.

Since it was impossible to know more precisely how many voters would turn up at any one polling location, provisions had to be in place for large numbers everywhere.[2] In general election administration terms, the ability of electoral authorities to allocate each voter to a specific polling place is crucial to efficient and cost-effective planning. In addition, particularly in circumstances like Afghanistan were secret ballot elections are being re-introduced after a considerable period of conflict, the assignment of individuals to particular locations provides an added element in the prevention of voter fraud, multiple voting and overall election security.

To be clear, the basic international standards for a reusable voter register include four main points:

1. The register must provide a unique identifier to each voter that can be used for subsequent changes or deletions,
2. The register must include adequate geo-administrative data to allow the grouping of voters by constituencies, and to allocate voters to polling locations,
3. The data capture (entry of data into a computerized database) should implement adequate validation to ensure a high degree of accuracy in data entered, and
4. The register should include bio-metric data for each person registered, or other pre-defined methodology, for the purpose of detecting duplicate registrations.[3]

Various experts in computerized voter registration systems have examined the situation regarding the register compiled in 2003/04 and updated in 2005.[4] Their analyses all reach to similar conclusions: that in comparing the current voters' list to the standards for a reusable voter register, it is clear that the existing database is inadequate and not viable for future elections for the following reasons:

1. There is no unique identifier. This fact alone guarantees that the data cannot accurately be updated. Attempts to add voters, change names, delete voters have a very high probability of creating more problems than they solve.

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[2] Afghanistan, Joint Elections Management Body (JEMB) *JEMB Final Report, 2005*)
[3] Mike Yard, 2007
[4] Miiro Hadija, *Analysis of the Current Conditions of the Voter and Civil Registries,* 2006)

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
Project

2. Data capture was done with no validation rules resulting in large numbers of voters with missing names, missing or invalid ages, missing geographic information, missing or invalid gender, etc.
3. Database does not include information on administrative units, which is required to attach individuals to particular polling locations. Only 90,838 records have village names, 24, 188 records have sub-village or street names out of a total of close to 13 million records. There is no data on municipalities, so the register can't be used for municipal elections.
4. No biometric data or other methodology for identifying and removing duplicates.[5]
5. In addition to these issues, in the transition from JEMB to IEC, the user interface for the computerized database was lost. Without this software component, the current database cannot be updated. The question of the value of conducting data mining on the existing voter registers raises questions regarding the use of scarce financial and time resources for this purpose with no certainty of success.[6]

Thus while it seems clear that a new registration is required, discussions continue regarding the potential use of the current register as the foundation for an upcoming "update" exercise which would attempt to "match" voters to their entry on the list. Attempts to conduct similar "matching" registrations have occurred elsewhere, most notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. Due to provisions in the Dayton Accords peace agreement, electoral authorities were required to "match" voters to their entry on a census database. This exercise proved extremely difficult, confusing, time consuming and costly.[7] In the Afghanistan's case, there is no binding requirement to base upcoming registration on the 2003 – 2005 databases. The IEC, the Afghan Government and donors will have to make hard choices if they decide to use the current register as it has obvious short falls.

The importance of an Independent Elections Commission with high integrity, capacity and resources to undertake elections in an increasing fiscally sustainable

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[5] Technical Group on Voter Registration, *Follow Up on a Joint Operation by the MoI and IEC,* 2005) [3] *Ibid*, [4] *Ibid*, [5] Ibid, 5-6,

[6] *Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_mining*: The term data mining is often used to apply to the two separate processes of knowledge discovery and prediction. Knowledge discovery provides explicit information that has a readable form and can be understood by a user. Forecasting, or predictive modeling provides predictions of future events and may be transparent and readable in some approaches (e.g. rule based systems) and opaque in others such as neural networks. Moreover, some data mining systems such as neural networks are inherently geared towards prediction and pattern recognition, rather than knowledge discovery.

[7] Denise Dauphinais, *Evaluation Reporting on Experiences of Other Countries,* October 21, 2007, at IEC

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT Project

manner by end- 2008 was emphasized at the January 2006, London Conference which brought together the Afghan Government and its international partners to agree on a development agenda for Afghanistan's future. This agreement, The Afghanistan Compact, includes as a benchmark that: *A permanent civil and voter registry with a single national identity document will be established by end-2009.*

b. **The Civil and Voter Registration (CVR) Pilot Project**

In light of the difficulties with the current register, the Post-Election Strategy Group (PESG), of experts working on elections and political process development in Afghanistan, recommended in 2005 that the possibility of a joint civil and voter registration be investigated. [8] Considerable investigation on such a program was undertaken and the CVR Pilot Project was designed as a sub-component of UNDP Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT) Project.

The pilot project was intended to provide crucial information regarding a number of issues prior to the planning and implementation of a national civil and voter registration project.

- First, to identify and test potential registration procedures and the use of bio-metric technologies;
- Second, to provide a basis for estimating the logistical requirements and project costs of a nation-wide CVR effort; and
- Third, to help determine the capacity of key Government of Afghanistan institutions to implement a joint civil and voter national registration project;

The pilot project was jointly conducted by Ministry of Interior and the Independent Elections Commission of Afghanistan with technical and financial support from UNDP/ELECT, United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) and IFES-Democracy at Large. The bulk of funding for the pilot project was received from UNDEF.[9] UNDP funded the financial gap for equipment, provided staff DSA and technical resource persons. IFES provided technical personnel, funded the printing of registration procedures and forms for the manual registration system, and funded the training of data entry operators and the Lessons Learned Workshop. The Independent Elections Commission provide office and storage space, furniture and office equipment, and stationary and made available its entire head-quarter and field staff. Last but not least, MoI officials participated in project planning, coordination and management, and provided field registration staff and security personnel.

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[8] PESG Report, 2005
[9] CVR Pilot Project Proposal, UNDEF

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
Project

The pilot project involved the testing of two methods of data capture and two duplicate analysis technologies:

In the first or "automated" trial, each registrant's biometric and personal history information meeting the MoI requirements for civil registration and IEC requirements for voter registration was collected at a single stop registration site through the use of a computerized data entry module. A digital photograph, meeting the technical requirements for facial recognition matching and national ID, was taken as was a scan of the registrant's iris. A paper receipt was issued at the place/time of registration. Data was collected for a period of six weeks from mid-July thru the end of August 2007.

In the second trial, the same personal history information was collected on a hand written form. A digital photo was taken of each registrant. The manually collected data was returned to Kabul where it was entered into the computerized database by trained data entry clerks. The digitally-stored photographs were then matched in the database with the registrant's personal history information. Data was collected over a two week period from the end of August to early September 2007. In both cases, images of the iris and face were transferred to Kabul on CDs and analyzed for duplicates.

Tender documents were prepared by the IFES CVR Specialist with input from the IFES ITC Advisor and IFES Database Developer and UNDP Logistics Advisor/ELECT. Iris and facial cameras and related software for data capture, duplicate analysis software and integration services were procured through an international competitive bidding process by UNDP. Laptop computes, generators, stabilizers and other related equipment were locally procured by UNDP.

Ministry of Interior identified three pilot project districts to represent the geographical socio-economical, political and ethnical characteristics of Afghanistan: Yawakalanga (Bamyan), Batikot (Nangarhar) and District 10 of Kabul. Villages within a particular district were selected based on their populations, proximity to one another, and means of travel: whether by car, horse or foot. Security considerations also played an important role in the choice of villages with a view of ensuring that all conditions possible in the registration environment of the national project were tested in the pilot.

An Ad hoc IEC based steering committee chaired by the CEO and Deputy CEO was responsible for most of the planning, coordination and implementation of the pilot project with occasional attendance by MoI representatives. Subcommittees for procedures, forms design and timelines were formed by the Ad hoc steering committee. These comprised of both national and IFES/ UNDP international staff. Several planning discussions were held with MoI representatives to resolve any

contentious issues. Public out reach materials were designed by IEC with an initial input from one TAF consultant and IFES Staff. Training materials were prepared by IEC project staff with technical support from the service provider (BioID Technologies.) Field operations were solely by IEC Field Operations and Logistics departments with support from the UNDP/ELECT Advisor and IFES CVR Logistics Advisor.

Pilot registration activities were successfully completed between July 15 and September 10 in the three selected districts. Twenty one thousand, eight hundred and eighty three (21,883) applicants were registered during the 6 weeks of data collection utilizing the "automated" system. Some 3,000 Afghans were registered during the two week period for collecting data using the paper/manual-based system. The information was analyzed and processed. Duplicates were identified and marked for deletion using both iris and facial recognition technologies. Sample CVR and family registers, and statistical reports were produced. All reports are attached as annexes.

 Both internal and external evaluations of the pilot project were successfully conducted between September 25 and October 20, 2007.

III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation methodology employed was designed based on:

- Daily monitoring and reporting forms
- Key informant interviews
- A Lessons Learned Workshop
- End of Field Registration Reports
- Document reviews
- Duplicate analysis Recognition
- Statistical analysis of Numerical Data

Monitoring and reporting forms that had been sent with the registration materials were filled by team registration chairpersons, district supervisors and an IEC monitoring cell that visited district 10 of Kabul and Batikot in Nangarhar. Four hundred and fifty eight forms were returned all together. A team of four national staff evaluated the forms and translated the results from Dari and Pashto to English.

Each of the three district supervisors submitted an end of field registration report. A Lessons Learned Workshop was organized by IEC and held on September 15 at IEC Headquarters in Kabul. In preparation for the workshop, an evaluation questionnaire was prepared by the IFES CVR Specialist and supplemented by senior IEC staff.

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT Project

Field registration team chairpersons, IEC district supervisors, MoI representatives, IEC heads of departments and other senior staff of the IEC Secretariat attended the workshop. The IFES CVR specialist also conducted interviews with those IEC departmental directors most closely involved in the CVR pilot project as well as with the IEC Chairman, the IEC Chief Electoral Officer and Deputy Chief Electoral Officer and the Chief Electoral Advisor for the UNDP/ELECT Project.

Two focus group discussions, moderated by the IFES CVR Specialist, were held with BioID technical personnel in Kabul. These discussions were witnessed by key IEC staff in the departments of IT, Logistics and Field Operations and the UNDP/ELECT Logistics Advisor. Demonstrations of the database were conducted by BioID for the evaluation team and to IEC- IT staff.

A review of project literature was conducted by the CVR Specialist. Data collected during the field data collection process was translated into English by IEC staff and analyzed by the IFES/CVR Specialist through the use of Content and Narrative Summary Analysis methodologies[10]. Numerical data from the database was analyzed through computer based methodologies by BioID. Other numerical data was analyzed by the IFES CVR Specialist using Exploratory Methods[11].

A draft report was prepared by the IFES CVR Specialist. The final report was collaboratively written by the IFES CVR Specialist and the UNDP/ELECT Chief Electoral Advisor.

IV. FINDINGS:

a. CVR Project Concept

During the evaluation, almost all respondents and participants clearly stated that a joint CVR would be in national interest. Many people expressed the facts that it

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[10] Berg, Bruce, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences.* Boston: Allan & Becon, 19950

[11] Exploratory methods are methods used to discover what data seems to be saying by using simple arithmetic and easy –to-draw pictures to summarize data: *http://home.ubalt.edu/ntsbarsh/stat-data/Topics.htm#rwsaq*: Last Viewed on November 1, 2007

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT Project

would cut costs in the long run, provide a national database that can be accessed by different government organs and provide a single national ID card that can be used for multiple benefits including voter identification and access to government benefit. Preliminary studies also established that the MoI had well established offices up to the district level and an established structure of two staff members at the district for the civil registry.

Ministry of Interior with the support of internal forces (ISAF) effectively managed to counter intercept a number of security threats in the pilot project area and was able to provide sufficient provide security for registration staff and the public at all registration sites.

However, an overwhelming majority of persons who participated in the evaluation indicated that while a combined CVR project would be in nation interest, it was neither feasible nor cost effective to successfully conduct a joint CVR and produce an accurate and reliable register, under the circumstances and with in the limited time framework to the March/April, 2009 presidential elections.

To cut costs and avoid duplication of resources, participants in the Lessons Learned Workshop and the IEC secretariat recommended that IEC should pass over some equipment and a complete database of registered applicants to the ministry of interior as a starting point for its civil registry. This would enable the ministry of Interior to register only persons below the age of 16 years

The reasons most advanced were:

- **Limited Time-Frame**

    While the MoI had undefined time frame to conduct the CVR or an independent civil registry, IEC had only 15 months from November 1 to plan, organize and conduct a national election including the re-registration of voters. Pilot project experience indicated that:

    i. Tendering for such a project would require four to six months:

        ➢ Preparation of tender documents (4 weeks),
        ➢ Request for proposals (12 weeks),
        ➢ Evaluation of bids and report writing (3 weeks) and
        ➢ Contract negotiations (4 weeks).
        ➢ Considering the nature, size and cost likely to be involved, there would be a need for post evaluation inspection which might require an additional four weeks.

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT Project

ii. Seeking UNDP country office and New York approval will require up to two months. It took at least 8 weeks for these processes for the much smaller scale pilot project.

iii. Defining contract terms and signing, took two weeks for the pilot project.

iv. Delivery of equipment is estimated to take not less than 3 months. All bidders for the pilot project indicated that they had to outsource some of the equipment needed to provide the required solution and used an additional four weeks to arrange for financial and personnel. This process took two months for the pilot project and the volume of the equipment for the national project will be substantially higher.

v. Once the equipment is in Kabul, there will be need for integration, configuration and customization, installation, testing and commissioning the system before it is deployed to the field.

vi. More importantly is the urgent need to mobilize funds on part of the Afghan Government and UNDP and it donor partners, recruit both national and international staff and arrange for other logistics required for the national project.

vii. Consultations have indicated May 1, 2008 as the earliest possible start date for field registration if critical decisions are made and Expression of Interest and Invitation to Bid are called by Mid December 2007.

- **Cost Implications**

  The total cost for the pilot project was about 450,000 USD. The table 1 below indicates the cost of equipment for the pilot. Table 2 indicates the cost of the pilot project equipment only based on average prices offered in CVR Pilot Project bids.

  Explanatory Notes
  Note 1: Table 2
  Section A: Cost of Equipment if Field Registration takes 6 months, implying that a team using one set of equipment will move to at least three registration sites with in the registration period
  Section B: Cost of Equipment if Field Registration takes 4 Months. One Kit to be used for at least two registration sites, within the registration period
  Section C: 6500 Cost of Equipment if Field Registration takes two months. Implies that a person will register and vote from the same location/ site

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
Project

Note 2: Unlike facial cameras and related software, the pilot project bids indicated that Iris cameras and related software were a monopoly of a few suppliers. All suppliers offered to supply iris cameras and software from the same companies. The prices offered to different suppliers by the same iris companies varied exponentially.

Table 1:	Pilot Project Costs			
Item	Description	Unit Cost	QTY	Total Cost
1	Iris Cameras with accessories	2400	15	36000
2	Photo Cameras with accessories	700	15	10500
3	Facial Recognition Capture and Assessment Software	1960	15	29400
4	Iris Recognition Capture and Assessment Software	800	15	12000
5	Facial Recognition Solution and Duplicate Analysis Software	20700	1	20700
7	ID Management Imaging Software	1176	1	1176
8	Iris Technology and Duplicate Analysis Software with Licenses for 30,000 Records	19500	1	19500
9	Server	38525	1	38525
10	Data Entry Application	38400	1	38400
13	Voltage Regulators	85	15	1275
14	CDs	0.25	1000	250
15	CD Copiers	625	15	9375
16	60GB Hard Drives	120	15	1800
17	Transport Boxes	15.5	15	232.5
18	SD Mem cards	42	15	630
19	Generators	760	15	11400
20	Printers	206	15	3090
21	Laptops(Used)	444.5	15	6667.5
	Total			240921

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
Project

TABLE 2: CVR NATIONAL REGISTRATION PROJECT							
			SECTION A: 6 Months 2000 Sites		SECTION B: 4 Months-3000 Sites		Section C: 2 Months 6500 Sites	
Item	Description	Unit Cost	QTY	Total Cost	QTY	Total Cost	QTY	Total Cost
1	Iris Cameras and Accessories	2400	2000	4800000	3000	7200000	6500	15600000
2	Facial Cameras and Accessories	700	2000	1400000	3000	2100000	6500	4550000
3	Facial Recognition Capture and Assessment Software	1960	1	1960	1	1960	1	1960
4	Iris Recognition Capture and Assessment Software	800	1	800	1	800	1	800
5	Facial Recognition Solution and Duplicate Analysis Software	20700	1	20700	1	20700	1	20700
6	Facial Recognition Duplicate Analysis Licenses	20700	200	4140000	300	6210000	400	8280000
7	ID Management Imaging Software	1176	1	1176	1	1176	1	1176
8	Iris Technology and Duplicate Analysis Software	19500	1	19500	1	19500	1	19500
9	Iris Duplicate Analysis Licenses	0.65	30000000	19500000	30000000	19500000	30000000	19500000
10	Server	38525	1	38525	1	38525	1	38525
11	Data Entry Application	38400	1	38400	1	38400	1	38400
13	Voltage Regulators	85	2000	170000	3000	255000	6500	552500
14	CDs	0.25	686500	171625	686500	171625	686500	171625
15	CD Copiers	625	2000	1250000	3000	1875000	6500	4062500
16	60GB Hard Drives	120	2000	240000	3000	360000	6500	780000
17	Transport Boxes	15.5	2000	31000	3000	46500	6500	100750
18	SD Mem cards	42	2000	84000	3000	126000	6500	273000
19	Generators	760	2000	1520000	3000	2280000	6500	4940000
20	Printers	206	2000	412000	3000	618000	6500	1339000
21	Laptops	1300	2000	2600000	3000	3900000	6500	8450000
22	Data Center Equipment	500000	1	500000	1	500000	1	500000
	Total			36939686		45263186		69220436

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
Project

- **Organizational and Managerial Issues**

  - **Mandates**

    The Civil Registry Law gives the mandate of conducting a civil registry to Ministry of Interior, the mandate to produce viable documents including national IDs is given to the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Article 13- Section (d) of the Electoral Law that defines an applicant's eligibility to register and vote gives the mandate to register voters to IEC. According to Article 13 section (d),
    "A person is eligible to vote in the election if that person has been registered as a voter by the Commission."

    Article 34 of the Electoral Law, obligates the Commission to

    " certify the voters' list or segments of it to be used in the elections and make it available for public inspection at least 15 days prior to election date in public places determined by the Commission"

    According to the constitution, the electoral law cannot be amended with in 12 months prior to an election[12]. With 15 months to a mandatory presidential election, the amendments to the electoral law have not been tabled to parliament, in any case the president has up to March 2008 to approve those amendments.

    The law that establishes a joint CVR is yet to be drafted, debated, passed by parliament, and assented to by the president.

    There are still a number legal, policy and political issues to be resolved. For example, The Technical Group on Voter Registration recommended that the CVR project be housed at the Ministry of Interior. This recommended was not enforceable as some of the equipment and key personnel used in the Pilot Project belonged to IEC and were used by IEC staff in their day to day operations. The recommendation for MoI to house the project may raise issues in regard to the Independence of the Elections Commission if its voter registry is entirely controlled by the ministry of interior. Most people who participated in the evaluation emphasized the need for clear mandates for each of the implementing partners with

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[12] Afghanistan, Constitution of Afghanistan, 1383 Arabic Calendar)

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT Project

all protocols defined and agreements signed before commencement of the project.

- **Inter-agency Coordination**

  Right from the onset of the CVR pilot project, limited coordination between the two principle implementing partners: MoI and IEC negatively impacted on the successful implementation of a joint CVR. The project was basically managed by an ad hoc IEC based steering committee, which did not necessarily meet all the time. The bulk of managing the project heavily lay on the shoulders of the IEC secretariat and staff that were more prepared to implement the project. The Independent Elections Commission also had most of the resources, many of which were donor supported and hence could not be easily transferred to MoI.

  If MoI had the technical and administrative capacity to coordinate and manage the national project, it was not demonstrated in the pilot project. Complaints about absence of MoI officials at the registration sites featured very prominently in the Lessons Learned Workshop. MoI participants were bombarded with statements like:

  "MoI will create more problems than solutions in a Joint CVR"

  "MoI had only kid staff that could neither read nor write properly"

  In almost all key informant interviews, participants expressed doubt about MoI's ability to manage the project. Several project staff members expressed stated that:

  "From the management perspective, MoI can not do the project"

  This was as a result of their experiences with MoI officials through the preparation and implementation of the pilot project

  Interestingly, in the Lessons Learned Workshop, MoI officials acknowledged the weaknesses of their staff in the field and expressed doubt in the ability of MoI to take a leadership role in implementing the national project

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
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b. **Technology**

- **"Automated" Vs "Manual" System**

    With very few exceptions, almost all project staff who participated in the evaluation expressed a preference for the computerized data entry module. The computerized data entry module produced more reliable data and was established to be more efficient. From Bamyan, where many of the CDs were not returned or were returned blank, the service provider managed to retrieve the missing data from the laptop hard drives. The computerized data entry module also enabled the capture of both bio and text data of an applicant on the same media reducing processing time and the need for data merging. The process also minimized mismatches, and data corruption.

    In the manual registration system, over 1000 registration forms and associated CDs had not been retrieved from the field several weeks after field registration. There was a tendency to pay more attention and emphasis on the retrieval of laptops and other higher value equipment than forms and CDs. Worse still, several CDs returned to the central data centre in Kabul from the manual registration system were blank as a result of failure to back up data properly from camera to CD.

    A good example was from Bamyan where two registration teams submitted blank CDs for almost the entire registration period and two others submitted CDs with the same images that had been captured at the first registration site. Where such errors occurred, there was no way of recovering the data, except going back to the field to trace applicants and re- registers them. This could be very costly, time consuming and frustrating to both applicants and registration officials if it happened in a national registration exercise.

    Bad and unreadable hand writings reduced the levels of accuracy of registration data from the manual registration system. Several staffs who participated in the 2003-2005 registrations also reported bad handwritings as big problem in processing registration data. Similar problems were reported in the Electoral Complaints Commission Report of Afghanistan (2006) as having made processing of complaints extremely difficult as some types of handwriting were completely unreadable. [13]

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[13] Afghanistan, Electoral Complaints Commission Final Report, 2006)

Hadija Miiro	Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist	Chief Electoral Advisor
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In manual registration system, there was no way of accessing and correcting the quality of a captured image as the camera purchased could not evaluate the quality of the image. Preliminary searches and consultations indicated that a camera with prompt quality features independent of automated data capture facilitation might not be readily available on the market. This limitation was also established from review of literature by other election administrations using manual registration[14]. For the photographs to be accurately analyzed and a match returned, if it exists, its quality must be with in a certain threshold and must meet ICAO standards[15].

- **Duplicate Analysis Software**

  A lot of research was done on the various biometric technologies as search engines for identifying duplicates in a database. Both Iris and Facial Recognition technologies were used to establish a person's identity (1:1) and to search an individual against a known list of persons already registered (1: Many) A total number of 43 persons were identified as having registered more than once. The same duplicates were identified by both systems except where either iris or face images had not been recorded. Eleven cases seemed to have deliberately registered twice in different places, different dates and in most cases with different particulars: date of birth, name and address. Twenty 27 cases could have been a result of operator error where an applicant was registered and the first entry not marked for deletion.

  Despite image quality assessment by the facial camera, face image quality was reported to be more difficult to control than iris image quality. On the other hand iris recognition was reported to have shown a higher failure to enrol rate and led to constant system hang-ups which delayed the data capture process. On the whole, error margins for both search engines were insignificant.

  As for costs, iris cameras were established to be times more expensive than facial camera. Preliminary searches and consultations indicated that the cost of iris licences was usually based on the number of images to be analysed while the cost of facial recognition licences could be limited to the number of workstations regardless of the size of the database.

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[14] Uganda, Electoral Commission, Evaluation *Report for the Computerized Photographic Register, 2001)*
[15] ICAO MRTDs, Biometric and Security Standards, Third Symposium and Exhibition, 2007) www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/fal/MRTDsymposium/Programme.pdf viewed on 03/11/07

Hadija Miiro	Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist	Chief Electoral Advisor
IFES Afghanistan	UNDP-ELECT Project

It was also noted that even when iris recognition is preferred for the national registration project, facial cameras and related software will still have to be procured as an applicant's photograph is required for the national ID or voter card. If facial recognition is preferred for the national registration project, the same photograph for the national ID or voter card would be used for duplicate analysis.

Several references also indicated that facial recognition was more widely used in large databases by interior ministries and election administrations. Examples sited included Colombia, Uganda, South Africa and Pakistan.[16]

c. **Output Targets and Actual Results**

1. Twenty one thousand eight hundred and eighty three (21,883) applicants were successfully registered against a target of 30,000 in the computerized system
2. Three thousand and two hundred (3200) applicants were successfully registered in the manual registration system against a target of 3000.
3. The registration was completed within the specified period of six weeks for the computerized system and 10 days for the manual system.
4. The average number of registered applicants per a day per a team was 51 for the computerized system and 106 for the manual registration system
5. The highest number of registrants was in Nangarhar with 8626 (39.4%). Bamyan registered a total of 6854 (31.3%) and Kabul 6403 (29.3%)
6. The highest number of registrants for a single registration team on a particular day was 88 for the computerized system and 120 for the manual system.
7. The number of female registrants almost equaled that of men.(10764-49% Females) (11119-51% Male)
8. Children below 7 years old were 5768 and they constituted 35.8% of the registered population.
9. There were 93 registrations without Iris and 17 without photographs
10. Five percent of registrants were not verified implying that they neither had any of the specified documents nor any body to vouch for them as Afghan citizens
11. The percentage of persons aged 7 and above without "face" for the manual registration was 5.5% compared to 0.11% for the computerized system. One of the reasons was due to failure or mistakes in copying images from camera to CDs.
12. The average number of forms entered into the database of the manual registration system per a day at the central data capture facility in Kabul was 48

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[16] 4 *Ibid*

Khadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral Advisor
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13. The data entry operator with the highest speed entered a maximum of 74 forms on a particular day and the operator with the slowest speed entered 4 forms on a particular day.

d. Service Provision and System Performance

System performance and service provision were examined to determine the extent to which critical success factors had been met by the service provider and other participating institutions. Reference was made to specific requirements made in the Invitation to Bid (ITB) document and the offer by the service provider. The "Service Provision and System Performance" annex attached to this report gives a detailed description of the achievements and shortfalls of the service provider. The examination was based on five broad categories namely:

1. Functional Database Development

The database was able to meet the following requirements:

- Assign unique identifiers to each record entered into the database
- Link photo and iris images to the text data of each applicant
- Produce a photo bearing voter's list that attaches an individual to a particular voting center/station or registration site
- Produce a family based register of all members of the same family
- Print registration forms, certificates and statistical reports
- Hide fields from view to specific work stations
- All data was encrypted

However the system did not meet the following requirements as had been requested for in the ITB and offered by provider in the response to the ITB; The system did
- Not provide an Audit trail
- Could not hide fields from audit by specified workstations and individuals
- Did not provide a platform for update processes by various users E.g. Ministry of Interior, IEC, Visa issuing authorities, passport hence failed the principle of multiple users
- Could not update dynamic variables- A person's age for example could not be updated

The provider also failed to develop the system on an Oracle platform. The loped into SQL platform only which the database was developed could only accommodate up to 50,000. This made the system un scalable to a national

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral Advisor
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registration database. Failure to develop the database on an Oracle database platform also limited the level of data and system security that could be attained.

2. **Data Capture Application, Overview of Technological Architecture and Supporting Functions**

- While the data entry application managed to capture all fields as specified on the registration form, the application could not accept numerical values like date of birth and registration number in Dari and Pashto. All such values were presented in English contrary to the requirement for all fields to be in Pashto and Dari. System users who could not read or understand English were unable to understand or interpret such values

- The database was also operated on stand alone workstations and did not demonstrate the functionality for sharing data across multiple work stations.

3. **Environmental Requirements of the System**

The system was able to operate well on 200-220V, 50/60Hz and temperatures 0°-40°

4. **Duplicate Analysis**

Duplicate analysis was successful and a number of proven duplicates were marked for deletion from the database. However the requirement to use both facial and iris recognition as principle search engines was not met. Iris recognition was used as the principle search engine and facial recognition as a supplementary.

5. **Capacity Building and Technological Transfer**

- National staff did not participate in critical aspects of system design, development, integration, configuration and customization as a result of
    - Failure to design and develop the system in Kabul as requested for by the project
    - Failure to sponsor national staff to travel to the service provider's laboratory in Pakistan
    - Reluctance on the part of the service provider to involve national staff in critical aspects of system design, development and administration

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
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- Training on the use of the integrated system was established to have been in sufficient. Some components of the training were done hurriedly and at the closure of the project. For example, training on installation of the server was hurriedly done a day before the provider left the country and when the project was winding up. Project staff were not trained in system administration and maintenance

- The only function that the national staff seemed to have received adequate participation was the installation of the data entry application on the 15 workstations. The training was however limited to system installation and configuration of the manual registration system. Project staff could neither add nor delete or modify entries on any of the applications or server as required passwords and source codes had not been handed over and licences not activated at the time of project closure

- Neither technical nor administrative staff participated in the testing and commission of the system. The entire process was driven by the service provider and project/IEC/IT staff participated mainly as end users.

   The failure to involve national IT staff to the greatest extent possible minimized the attainment of Output 1 of the ELECT Project:

   "IEC institutional Capacity Further Built to carry out its mandate as an Independent Constitutional Body"[17]

With regard to other aspects of the project IEC staffs effectively participated in: designing of registration procedures and forms, designing of timelines and monitoring and evaluation of the pilot project. They did spearhead and managed the design and implementation of the training, public out reach activities, field operations and with some international staff support, effectively participated in the planning of field activities, arranging for logistics and retrieval of registration data and materials.

The absence of a voter registration department and dedicated staff for voter registration however meant that no IEC staff worked full time on the project. This reduced the level of knowledge transfer in the preparation of registration materials and participation in the evaluation exercise. Because the pilot project was on a very small scale, IEC staffs will still need the presence of international staff in planning and procedures, logistics, voter registration, data processing and IT and project management and coordination. The IEC also requires well

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[17] [1] *Ibid*- Page 2)

Khadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral Advisor
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trained and properly facilitated staff in the field with a good grasp of the various aspects of the voter registration process

6. **Trouble Shooting, Maintenance and Support by BioID**

The provider supplied two full time technical staff in Kabul for the entire period of project implementation. When required, technical staffs were deployed to the registration sites to trouble shoot the system and provide technical support to the registration sites. Additional support was provided by the Provider's online support facility. Senior staff traveled several time to Kabul to assist in setting up the system and other project management functions

e. <u>**Project Staffing, Training and MoI Support**</u>

- **Staffing**

  The independent Elections Commission and MoI used their current levels of staffing to support the pilot project. The IEC used its Provincial Election Officers (PEO) as district supervisors, registration team chairpersons and registration officers. Ministry of Interior provided at least three staffs to work on the five member registration teams.

- **Training**

  Thirty people from IEC and MoI attended a simulation demonstration at the IEC office in Kabul. Sixteen people were trained as trainers (TOT) for ten days by IEC staff at the IEC office in Kabul from June 20 to July 1, 2007. The TOT trained field registration staff on procedures. BioID trained IEC IT staff and data entry operators in the field. Training of field registration staff was conducted from July 4, to July 12 at each of the provincial office in Kabul, Nangarhar and Bamyan. One briefing was conducted for members of the monitoring cell and one for FEFA observers. Three trainers from head office went to the three provinces to train registration staff for the manual registration system

- **MoI Support**

  Just before the start of the field registration in mid August, a memorandum of understanding between IEC and MoI was signed. The ministry of interior agreed to provide registration staff and pay their Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA).

Khadija Miiro

Civil and Voter Registration Specialist

IFES Afghanistan

Denise Dauphinais

Chief Electoral Advisor

UNDP-ELECT Project

However, during the 6-7 weeks of field registration, many field staff complained that MoI staff regularly abandoned their duties or were not cooperative due to failure to pay their DSA on time. In one of the provincial reports, it was reported that staff seconded by MoI were not actually regular MoI staff but hand picked persons some times below the age of 18. This feeling was echoed in the Lessons Learned Workshop and by almost all Key Informants interviewed.

As one district supervisor stated:

"The male employees of MoI were very active, while female employees were weak. In fact they were not employees of MoI, but related to 2 families. Four girls probably aged not more than 14 years were included"

Another district chairperson complained that:

"Out of 15 persons employed by MoI only 4 were good in writing. The rest could not properly read or write although they were employed for the job"

One head office project staff who participated in monitoring field registrations reported that:

"The recruitment of staff was not according to procedures. Staff recruited by MoI was indeed not fully experienced in the field."

f. Public Outreach

Public out reach campaigns started a month before field registration and ended two weeks into the registration exercise. Several posters, pamphlets and leaflets were distributed in the project areas. Public meetings were also held in one or more villages and national radios run several slots for about eight weeks.

Public Out reach activities played an important role in the success of the pilot project. Where there were some objections against the project especially against taking women/girl photographs and registering children, public out reach campaigns stretched to moving from door to door explaining the need to register and persuading women to register themselves and their children. In a number of areas, where the public complained about combined registration, public out reach officials explained the need to participate in the pilot and the benefits for a new and secure ID.

Khadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
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Many people however expressed the desire for public out reach activities to continue right to the end of the exercise and advised registration officials to increase the use of radio slots and civic education meetings.

There were a few complaints about shortage of public out reach materials.

V. SUCCESSES, LIMITATIONS, LESSONS LEARNED AND PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED

The pilot project was successfully conducted and lessons were drawn. The principle objective of designing, agreeing upon and implementing a joint civil and pilot project on the basis of which decisions and plans for the national registration project would be based was attained

a. **Successes, Limitations and Lessons Learned**
1. The feasibility of the CVR pilot project was established both in the immediate and distant future
2. Cost requirements for the national project can now be more accurately determined
3. The required time frame for the national registration exercise have been established
4. The most suitable and cost effective registration procedures and technologies have been determined
5. Staffing and logistics levels can now be determined either for a combined CVR or an independent voter registration exercise.
6. Additional requirements by the implementing partners can now be established in order to produce an accurate and sustainable voters' list for the 2009 elections
7. Among the main deliverables of the system was the production of a sample register
8. A photo bearing register was produced attaching each individual to a particular voting center/station/registration site
9. Duplicates were detected by both iris and facial recognition software and marked for deletion from the database
10. IEC staffs effectively participated in some aspects of the pilot project and their capacity to design registration procedures and forms, plan and arrange for logistics, design timelines, training and public materials was enhanced
11. The IEC staffs involved in the internal review process were very cooperative and rapidly responded to queries, participated fully in key informant interviews, and liaised with field staff to gather information needed for the evaluation

Khadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
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12. The Afghan National Army, Police, ISAF and MoI interior played an important role in ensuring sufficient security in all areas where registration took place. In Nangarhar province, a number of attempts to target registration staff or disrupt the registration were counter foiled.
13. Ministry of Interior officials were very cooperative in the system investigations, in identifying weaknesses in the civil registry and in coordinating with security organs
14. Although not properly notified, local administration, district police chief, elders, Mullahs, and the public all welcomed the projected, participated actively, and assisted registration officials and the public conduct the registration successful

However, the process was not without problems. Below is a listing of the most commonly experienced problems and proposals on how various problems could be avoided or minimized.

b. Problems Experienced
The most commonly reported problems across board were:

1. Software and Database Constraints Associated With the Computerized Data Entry Module

- Almost all registration teams reported that the system frequently hanged suspending registrations for several hours. Although the cause of the problem was never established, possible explanations included data back up taking place at the same time as data capture, anti virus software running in the back ground and failure to properly integration the various components of the system.
- Failure of the database to accept Dari and Pashto languages in critical numerical fields: Date of birth, registration number, and family number could not be entered in Dari or Pashto. This was contrary to what had been agreed with the service provider to develop and provide a Dari and Pashto data entry application.
- Registration officers could not edit critical fields. Once an applicant or operator realized h\she had made some mistake on the record, the record could not be edited once it was saved. Applicants had to be re-registered. This wasted resources and created multiple registrations in the data base especially when the operator omitted to mark the previous record for deletion.
- Failure to copy to CD. A number of cases were reported where the system indicated that records had been copied to CD, only to check later and the CD was empty. Where registration staffs were not smart enough to check at all times and save applicants' data, such CDs were returned empty

Hadija Miiro
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan
Project

Denise Dauphinais
Chief Electoral

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- Systems failure to accept villages that were not pre-programmed into the system led to some applicants being registered under villages to which they did not belong. This can have serious implications in the national project as each individual is required by law to register and vote only in areas where they reside. The same problem arose when a person's language or relation to the head the family was not included in the database
- Failure of the application to accept identical dates of birth made it impossible to register twins in the same family

2. Hardware Failures

- CD Drives collapsed due to dust and high humidity, and the fact that most laptops were old, had been handled by numerous people for earlier registrations and the CD ROMs were bruised.
- Battery Charger failures: Nine of the 15 batteries that were originally purchase failed and had to be replaced with higher quality batteries.
- The 2KV generators supplied could not support the entire system at the same time. Many participants in the Lessons Learned Workshop reported that the generator could not run all the equipments at the same time. They had to switch off one or more equipment for the others to run.
- CD copiers failed in a few cases and in others registration officers had not grasped the process of using them

3. Logistical Problems

Logistical complaints included shortage of printer cartridges and toner, failure to supply measuring tapes and photo screens, inadequate fuel and top up cards for mobile telephones.

Other complaints related to hiring of vehicles where horses were required, lack of internet at the provincial offices and shortage of public outreach materials.

4. Lack of Cooperation by Ministry of Interior (MOI) Staff

As indicated in earlier sections, lack of corporation from MoI registration staff and absenteeism of some of their staff was sited as a major hindrance to the successful implementation of the pilot project.

Statements like the ones below were very common

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Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
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"The Staff of MoI during implementation of the project did not have good cooperation with IEC staff and sometimes they did not repot for work"

"MoI staff left all work to IEC staffs when the DSA delayed to be paid on time. And they did not want to do some tasks. This was bad for the project"

5. **Public Understanding of the Project**

    While the majority of people welcomed the CVR project and perceived it as a great opportunity to be registered and obtain a national ID, there were some who were skeptical and interpreted registration as an attempt by government to identify opponents and victimize them. This perception was most expressed in Nangarhar in statements like:

    "Is this a government spy program to specify and target the government opposition?"

    "Why are some area included and others not included? Is it to disadvantage some places"

    There were also a few people who showed antagonism against taking photographs of women, girls and children especially in Nangarhar province.

    While the most catching motivation was the possibility of obtaining a good quality national ID, many people especially those who clearly understood the work of IEC, and IEC and MoI staff expressed preference to a separate and independent voter registration exercise.

6. **Administrative Concerns**

    - **Lack of a Project Coordinator and a Voter Registration Department at the IEC**

        - Right from the beginning, the project did not have a designated project coordinator with the skills and authority to see things through. While good decisions were frequently taken, some of them were not implemented or were implemented belatedly.

        - While the pilot project provided a great opportunity to enhance the capacity of IEC staff in voter registration functions, the benefits were minimal as the IEC structure did not provide for a voter

Khadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
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registration department or section. There was a misconception that IT and voter registration were one and the same function. Attempts to recruit a national CVR Counter part and a project coordinator were unsuccessful. A dedicated unit or personnel to the voter registration function would have improved communication, enhanced capacity and eased the implementation management process.

- **Lack of Coordination with Local Officials**

  Many mullahs, head teachers and police chiefs complained to registration officials of having been left out of the process. Strong feelings were expressed in the Lessons Learned Workshop of the need to involve village heads, police chiefs, mosque owners or caretakers and head teachers. Some people and institutions were reported to having refused the registration to take place in their premises. Some of the reasons given were that they had not been notified or requested and the fact that registration took place during school term time. A few registration sites especially in Kabul did not open on time as a result of this omission.

- **Lack of A District Office for Storage of Materials and Absence of IT Staff**

  District supervisors complained of great distances they had to travel to the province to get or return materials due to lack of storage facilities and offices at the districts. Failure to provide an IT person to each registration team or a set of teams was reported to have caused delays in repairs and trouble shooting the computerized data entry operations. Some registration sites closed on some days due to this failure.

- **Timing of the Registration**

  Interestingly although field registration was conducted during the best part of summer, many people did not like the timing, the reason being that it was an agricultural period and most people were attending to their farms

- **Security Problems**

  Were mainly reported only in Nangarhar where rebel activity included attempts to detonate bombs on registration officials, and threats to assassinate the area Member of the National Assembly. A few

Khadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
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locations in Nangarhar were changed due to security problems. In all cases security threats were effectively contained by ANA, ANP and ISAF. The main project administrative weaknesses hinged around;

- **Problems Reported Less Frequently**

   Problems that were reported less frequently included limited media broadcast, recruitment of people who were already employed instead of those who were jobless, failure to separate men and women registration centers, failure to provide uniforms to registration staff, failure to extend the registration beyond 4.00 P.M, and anticipated problems in identifying staff with the required computer skills to man the computerized registration system.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

a. A good majority of the population cleared understood the benefits of a Joint CVR and welcomed the process. However, almost all persons who participated in the internal evaluation of the pilot project realized the need to strike a balance between limited resources, strict time frames to the 2009/2010 elections, the need to identify people with basic literacy and computer skills and train them adequately and the failure of MoI to demonstrate capacity as a key player in implementing a national CVR Project.

b. The computerized data entry module was established to be more efficient as it removed the problems associated with poor handwritings and minimized data losses. The manual registration system was established to have problems. While the latter was established to be less costly, it was also clear that it was more laborious and more prone to errors, would require a longer period for data entry and analysis at head office, and a more sophisticated approach for merging individual photographs to text data.

c. While iris recognition was broadly known to be efficient in duplicate analysis, it was established to be much more expensive than facial recognition. Its relevance to the voter registration was also limited. Facial recognition was established to be as accurate, was cheaper, and two birds could be hit with one stone: The same photo for duplicate analysis could be used for the national ID or voter card. If iris recognition is used, there would still be a need to purchase facial cameras and related software to capture an applicant's photograph. Using both iris and facial recognition technology required more sophisticated integration and customization and could have been one of the reasons for frequent system hang-ups and low speed.

Khadija Miiro
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan
Project

Denise Dauphinais
Chief Electoral

UNDP-ELECT

d. There was clear evidence that little coordination existed between IEC and MoI and that MoI had limited capacity to take a leading role in implementing the Joint CVR project. The IEC demonstrated a higher capability to run the project but this was unlikely as there were still legal and policy impediments. There was also skepticism as to whether the independence and efficient implementation of the IEC would not be compromised if it solely depended on another government department to supply it with a voters' list: By law, the IEC had the mandate to register all eligible voters in an efficient and timely manner.

e. The lack of a clear mandate impacted negatively on the effective implementation of the pilot project delayed decision making and slowed implementation of activities. Clear definition mandates for each institution involved will be required at or before the on set of the national registration project. Worse still MoI did not demonstrate the capacity, ability and good will to mobilize enough personnel with the required levels of basic literacy and computer skills to roll out a national registration exercise.

f. The absence of a voter registration department and staff dedicated to the voter registration activity and absence of a project coordinator all slowed down the project implementation process and limited the enhancement of capacity of the national staff. These factors slowed down the process and limited knowledge transfer to IEC staff to manage subsequent registrations.

g. Failure on the part of the service provider to design, supply and test the system in a timely manner, and its failure to involve national staff in critical stages of system design, development, customization, and testing and system administration resulted into delayed the process as system correction and customization that would have been done during the initial system set up had to be done when they system was already in the field. As the closure of the project, national staff could hardly administer the system as little capacity was enhanced.

h. A few logistical problems were experienced in the course of implementing the project especially shortage of some registration materials like printer cartridges and toner. However none of these problems are insurmountable and all can be rectified with proper planning, good coordination, adequate resources and an early start.

Khadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

To strike a balance between numerous factors, it is recommended that:

1. Registration in the immediate future is limited to persons aged 16 years or above. This will cut costs and can be easier achieved in the remaining period of 15 months to the 2009 Presidential Elections
2. To minimize the requirement for policy adjustments and improve coordination and project management, the Independent Elections Commission, that has the uttermost need and urgency for a viable voters' list be left to conduct the registration of all voters aged 16 years or above
3. A computerized data entry module will be more efficient in the capture of applicants' information as it will:
    - Enable all registration data to be captured on a single media, minimizing the need for data merging.
    - The issuance of a photo bearing registration certificate that will indicate a persons voting location and that can be used for purposes of voting in case of time and financial constraints to complete the entire process before the 2009 Presidential Elections.
4. Facial recognition should be used for duplicate analysis to minimize the costs of purchasing both iris and facial equipment and software and to improve system performance
5. A voter registration department and staff dedicated to voter registration should be established by IEC as a priority area
6. A strong coordination body is required for the national project with clear and well defined mandates and responsibilities for each of the implementing partners. This should be set up prior or on the onset of project start.
7. To minimize duplication of resources and efforts protocols a clear understanding will need to be reached and protocols signed to enable the IEC pass over a complete database of all registered applicants to the ministry of Interior for its civil registry

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Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral
Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT
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IX. LIST OF ANNEXES
1. Sample of the Photo Bearing -Polling Location based Register
2. Samples of Duplicate Registrations
3. Monitoring and Reporting Form for Team Chairpersons
4. Monitoring and Evaluation Form for District Supervisors
5. Lessons Learned Workshop-Question Guide
6. Key Informant Questionnaire
7. CVR Main Registration Form for computerized system
8. CVR Supplementary Registration Form for Manual System
9. Statistical Tables
10. Sample of Family Based Register

X. LIST OF CVR PILOT PROJECT DOCUMENTS
1. "Analysis of the Current Conditions of the Voter and Civil Registries in Afghanistan" by Hadija Miiro (IFES), 2006
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4. "Pakistan Trip Report" by Hadija Miiro (IFES)
5. "CVR Pilot Project Registration Procedures-Computerized System" IFES, IEC, UNDP
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7. United Nations Development Fund, "Advisory Note to United Nations Democracy Fund" (UNDEF) by UNDP, IFES, IEC 2006
8. "Invitation to Bid Documents for CVR Pilot Project Equipment and Integration Services" Hadija Miiro(IFES), Pontius Namugera, (IFES), Roger Bowen (IFES) Yuri Ozerov(UNDP), Moqim Azizi (UNDP)

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT Project

9. CVR Registration Questionnaire for Computerized System by IEC based Forms Committee, IFES
10. CVR Registration Questionnaire for Manual Registration System by IEC based Forms Committee, IFES
11. ITB Evaluation Methodology and Guide Lines by Hadija Miiro(IFES)
12. ITB Evaluation Report By Hadija Miiro (IFES)
13. Pilot Project Village and Polling Center List by Patrick Macgovern (IFES), Zamari Q(IEC) and Ministry of Interior
14. CVR Equipment and Materials List by Yuri Ozerov (UNDP), Bilal Ahmed (IEC), Dr.Shahla (IEC), Hadija Miiro (IFES)
15. Discussion Guide with Service Provider (BioID) by Hadija Miiro (IFES)
16. Data Entry Operator Questionnaire by Pontius Namugera (IFES) and Hadija Miiro (IFES)
17. CVR Training Materials by Dr.Shahla and IEC Training Department Staff
18. Public Outreach Materials by Bakhtyar Muhammad and IEC Public Out Reach Materials, IFES, IEC, TAF
19. Memorandum of Understanding between IEC and MoI
20. CVR Project Time Line Revised, November 2006

These documents can be obtained from the IEC "P", IFES Share Drive or on request to the Independent Elections Commission of Afghanistan at: info@iec.org.af

END

Hadija Miiro   Denise Dauphinais
Civil and Voter Registration Specialist   Chief Electoral Advisor
IFES Afghanistan   UNDP-ELECT Project